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1. INTRODUCTION
Many Internet technologies, applications, and services1 have value that increases with the
size of their user base, i.e., they exhibit positive externalities or network effects. Externali-
ties are well-known [Cabral 1990] to have dual effects on the adoption pattern of services.
Adoption rapidly accelerates after passing a critical threshold (until the market starts sat-
urating), but reaching this critical level of adoption is often slow and difficult. In practice,
services that fail often do so during this early stage, as many potential adopters see a cost
that exceeds the (low) initial value of the service. This is commonly mentioned as an expla-
nation for the limited or stalled adoption of many Internet security protocols [Ozment and
Schechter 2006].
A common approach (see again [Ozment and Schechter 2006]) to overcome this initial
hurdle is to bundle services, in the hope that the bundle has broader appeal and is, there-
fore, able to overcome early adoption inertia. The main unknown is the extent to which
dependencies (as measured by a joint distribution) or correlation in how users value the in-
dividual services influence their adoption decision for the bundle. We illustrate this next by
way of examples, which also (and more importantly) demonstrate the diversity of Internet
services for which this arises.
1.1. Anonymous communications and secure distributed storage
Anonymous communication systems have been available for some time, e.g., see [Ferna´ndez
Franco 2012] for a recent survey, but in spite of a recent rise in both profile [Arthur 2013]
and usage [Brewster 2013], they remain relatively marginal, i.e., have not yet attracted a
large user-base. This can affect their robustness and their ability to deliver strong anonymity
guarantees (mixing traffic from more users and tapping into the resources contributed by
those users can improve both anonymity and robustness, at least in P2P based implemen-
tations of such systems).
Overcoming the limited appeal (to users) of anonymous communications and increas-
ing the number of users such a system can tap into, can be realized by bundling it with
1For the sake of conciseness, we use the term services in the rest of the paper.
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another service. Ideally, this other service should exhibit technical synergies with anony-
mous communications so as to facilitate a joint implementation. Secure distributed storage
is a possible candidate. It enables the automatic and encrypted backup of local files over
a distributed set of network peers (see BuddyBackup2 for an example), and shares with
anonymous communications a reliance on cryptographic primitives and protocols, as well
as a value that grows with its number of adopters (more users likely means a more reliable
system). The main question is whether combining those two services can increase adoption
for both. The answer depends on the cost versus value of the bundle, and how this varies
across users.
The cost of the bundle consists of the communication (bandwidth), processing, and stor-
age costs of the two services, with anonymous communications calling mostly for band-
width and processing resources, and secure distributed storage requiring primarily storage
resources and to a lesser extent processing and communication resources. Because the two
services have mostly independent needs, those costs should be approximately additive. The
value a user assigns to the bundle depends on her level of usage of anonymous communi-
cations and reliance on secure distributed storage as a means of preserving and accessing
her personal data. This value will change as more users adopt the bundle (it improves the
quality and reliability of both services), but the decisions of early adopters depend primarily
on how they intrinsically value access to anonymous communication and secure distributed
storage.
For illustration purposes, assume that within a given user population the stand-alone
values of both services are uniformly distributed. However, to reflect the fact that secure
distributed storage should be attractive to most users while anonymous communications
will likely have more limited appeal, we assume that the stand-alone values of the former
are in [a, 1], 0 < a < 1, while they span the full [0, 1] range for the latter. In other words,
most users view secure distributed storage as useful (valued at ≥ a), while fewer assign a
similar value (in the range [a, 1]) to anonymous communications. Under those assumptions,
correlation in user valuations clearly affects the number of early adopters the service bundle
will attract. For example, it is relatively easy to show (see Section 4 for related derivation
details) that the cost threshold beyond which there are no early adopters for the bundle
is 2 under perfect positive correlation, but only a+ 1 under perfect negative correlation.
1.2. Online discussion forums
Consider next the case of an online discussion forum3 dedicated to a particular topic. Par-
ticipating in such a forum has some intrinsic value, e.g., from access to promotions and
discounts on related products, but its core value often comes from the answers and advice it
provides in response to users’ questions. To succeed, a forum must, therefore, accumulate a
large enough “knowledge-base” and consequently achieve a critical mass of users. This can
be challenging, as the added value from Q&A’s is essentially absent in the early stages, and
promotions and discounts alone may be insufficient to attract enough early adopters. Com-
bining the topics of multiple forums under a common umbrella is one way to address this
challenge. The stand-alone value of such a “bundled” forum, e.g., promotions and discounts
that now extend across more products, may appeal to a broader user base, and allow it to
succeed where individual forums would not have. The question we seek to answer is again
when and why this may be the case?
As with anonymous communications and secure distributed storage, whether a bundled
forum attracts more early adopters, and therefore improves its odds of success, depends on
its initial cost-benefit ratio relative to that of individual forums. The “cost” of joining a
bundled forum, e.g., the amount of time needed to extract useful information, can be higher
2http://www.buddybackup.com/.
3Similar arguments hold for other systems of a similar “crowdsourcing” nature, e.g., recommender systems.
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than that of more focused, single-topic forums. Its combined stand-alone value arguably
depends on many factors, but a reasonable first approximation is again to assume that it
is the sum of the stand-alone values (product promotions and discounts) associated with
both topics. As in the previous example, whether this sum exceeds the cost of joining the
forum, which determines the number of early adopters, depends to a large extent on the
joint distribution of user valuations for the individual forums; an important measure of
which is their correlation.
For purpose of illustration, consider a scenario where we contemplate merging two discus-
sion forums, whose stand-alone values follow identical uniform distributions when measured
across a population of users (they are of equal value on average). Assume further that for a
given user, the values she sees in the two forums are either perfectly positively or perfectly
negatively correlated, i.e., equal or diametrically opposed. Under perfect positive correla-
tion, the stand-alone value that any user derives from the bundled forum is then simply
twice the value she sees in either individual forum. If we assume that the cost of joining
the bundled forum is also twice that of joining a single-topic forum, e.g., it takes twice as
long to find relevant information, then it is easy to show that bundling has no impact on
early adoption, and the bundled forum sees the same number of potential early adopters4 as
either original forum. In contrast, when values are perfectly negatively correlated, all users
now see the same (average) value from joining the bundled forum. In this case either no
user or all users will be early adopters, depending on whether this average value is above
or below the bundle’s cost. Hence, unlike the case of perfect positive correlation, bundling
can significantly affect the number of early adopters.
1.3. Summary
As the above examples hopefully illustrated, correlation in how users value different services
and/or technologies (and more generally their joint distribution) can have a significant effect
on whether combining them in a bundle is beneficial. In the rest of this paper, we explore
this issue in a systematic fashion. Section 2 offers a brief review of related works. Section 3
introduces our model for service adoption. Section 4 considers the case where user affinities
for the services are represented as continuous uniform random variables. It first explores
the extreme cases of perfect positive and negative correlation in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4,
respectively, while Section 4.5 investigates the intermediate case of independent affinities.
The latter section illustrates the difficulty of characterizing the bundle’s adoption under
general correlation, and motivates the model of Section 5 where user affinities for the services
are captured through correlated discrete (Bernoulli) random variables with parameterized
correlation. Section 6 articulates the findings that emerge from the analysis, and numerically
explores their robustness through limited extensions to the model. Section 7 offers a brief
conclusion.
2. RELATED WORK
The topic of this paper is at the intersection of two major lines of work; product and
technology diffusion, and product and service bundling.
Modeling how products and services diffuse through a population of potential users, i.e.,
are being adopted, is a topic of longstanding interest in marketing research with [Peres
et al. 2010] offering a recent review of available models and techniques. The models most
relevant to our investigation are those based on the approach introduced in [Cabral 1990]
and extended in many subsequent works, which explore product diffusion in the presence of
externalities using an adoption decision process that reflects the utility of individual users.
As described in Section 3, the adoption model we rely on belongs to this line of work.
4Note though that final adoption can be different depending on the strength of the externality factor of the
combined topics.
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However, and except for a few recent works that we review below, the aspect of bundling
had not been incorporated in those investigations, and this is one of the aspects we focus
on in the paper.
There has obviously been a significant literature devoted to bundling as a stand-alone
topic (see [Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009] for a recent review). The main goal of most of
those works has typically been the development of optimal bundling and pricing strategies,
and pricing is a dimension that is largely absent from our investigation in that service costs5
are assumed given and exogenous. Instead, our focus is mostly on how the joint distribu-
tion in service valuation across users (as measured through their correlation coefficient),
determines whether the adoption level of a service bundle can exceed those of separate
service offerings. Correlation in how users value different services and the impact this has
on bundling strategies is in itself a topic that several prior works have explicitly taken into
account, e.g., [Schmalensee 1984; McAfee et al. 1989; Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999]. In gen-
eral, negative correlation in demand improves bundling’s benefits over separate offerings,
although high marginal costs (compared to the average value of the bundle) can negate
this effect. Conversely, a high positive correlation tends to yield the opposite outcome, i.e.,
favor separate (pure component) offerings. As highlighted in the examples of Section 1, our
focus on maximizing adoption results in more nuanced outcomes, with correlation playing
a more ambivalent role in determining the success of a bundled offering. Furthermore, early
works on bundling did not account for the potential impact of externalities.
There are to-date only three works we are aware of [Prasad et al. 2010; Pang and Etzion
2012; Chao and Derdenger 2013] that have investigated the problem of bundling products
or services with externalities, and we briefly review how these papers differ from our in-
vestigation. First and as has been the norm in the bundling literature, those three papers
all focus on optimal pricing strategies, while we assume that costs (prices) are exogenous
parameters and instead seek to understand their impact (and that of other factors) on the
adoption level of a bundled offering. Second, the impact of value (demand) correlation is
essentially absent from those three prior works.
Specifically, [Prasad et al. 2010] focuses on optimal pricing while assuming independent
valuations for the two services. [Pang and Etzion 2012] explores the joint offering of a
product and a complementary service, where the latter exhibits positive externalities. As
in [Prasad et al. 2010], users’ valuations for the product and its complementary service
are assumed independent, and there is no investigation of the potential impact of their
correlation. [Chao and Derdenger 2013] is cast in the context of a two-sided market (the
two market sides create externalities), where the platform provider seeks to decide how to
bundle and price new content with the platform it offers, given the existence of an installed
based of users and content developers. The focus is again on optimal pricing strategies and
bundling decisions, and there is no correlation between the value of the new content and that
of earlier content. These are again important differences with our work, which furthermore
does not involve the presence of an existing user base. As [Chao and Derdenger 2013]’s title
indicates and as the paper emphasizes (Section 2.2), this plays an important role in the
platform’s strategic decisions. In contrast, our interest lies primarily in understanding how
bundling can help nascent Internet services ultimately reach the high levels of adoption they
need to realize their full value potential and succeed.
3. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this section, we review the basic structure of the models on which we rely to capture the
evolution of service adoption.
5The time needed to retrieve information in a discussion forum, or the communication, processing and
storage resources that either anonymous communications or secure distributed storage require.
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3.1. Separate (unbundled) service offerings
We consider a model for the adoption of multiple (two) services by a heterogeneous popu-
lation of potential users. The perceived utility Vi(xi(t)) of service i ∈ {1, 2} by a (random)
user given that a fraction xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] of the population has adopted the service at time
t incorporates three components: i) the user’s affinity (stand-alone value) for the service
(capturing users’ heterogeneity), ii) the network externality tied to the adoption level of
the service, and iii) the service cost. Specifically:
Vi(xi(t)) = Ui + eixi(t)− ci, i ∈ {1, 2}, (1)
where i) Ui ≥ 0 is the user’s (random) affinity for service i; ii) ei ≥ 0 is the strength of the
externality contribution for service i; and iii) ci ≥ 0 is the cost of adopting service i. As is
common, for analytical tractability we adopt a linear externality model6.
When services are offered separately, users make adoption decisions for each based on
their respective utilities:
user adopts service i at time t with adoption level xi(t) ⇔ Vi(xi(t)) > 0.
In particular, there is no “budget constraint” where adoption of one service by a user affects
adoption of the other service by that user; this is natural given our focus on adoption costs,
e.g., communication, storage, processing, etc., rather than pricing. However, while service
adoption decisions are uncoupled, the random variables (U1, U2), capturing heterogeneity
in user affinity, may be correlated.
Denote as hi(xi) = P(Vi(xi) > 0) the probability a random user adopts service i given an
adoption level xi. An equilibrium for this model is any x
∗
i such that
hi(x
∗
i ) = P(Ui > ci − eix∗i ) = x∗i . (2)
When the two services are offered separately they achieve adoption equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. One of our goals is to compare these equilibria to those realized when the two
services are bundled, and characterize differences as a function of the model’s parameters
(e1, e2, c1, c2) and the joint distribution of (U1, U2).
3.2. Bundled service offerings
Under bundling, a user must decide whether to adopt either both services or neither, i.e.,
we do not consider the case of mixed bundling where services are simultaneously offered
as a bundle and separately. The basis for a user’s decision is now the aggregate utility she
derives from the bundle:
user adopts the bundle at time t ⇔ V (x(t)) > 0,
where consistent with Eq. (1)
V (x(t)) = V1(x(t)) + V2(x(t)) = U + ex(t)− c. (3)
Here, x(t) is the (common) adoption level of the bundled services. Note the assumption
of additive values for the two services, i.e., V (x(t)) = V1(x(t)) + V2(x(t)), which implies
that they are neither substitute nor complement. Under this assumption, U = U1 + U2 is
the aggregate intrinsic value of the bundled services, e = e1 + e2 is the aggregate force of
the externality, and c is the aggregate cost, which for simplicity also satisfies c = c1 + c2.
Extending the model to account for instances where the two services are partial complements
or substitutes, as well as for possible economies of scope in the cost of a service bundle is
clearly of interest. Such extensions can be readily incorporated in the models, but add
6The assumption of linear externality typically does not affect the nature of the findings, i.e., they hold
qualitatively for distributions with CDF F (u), which share with the uniform distribution a non-decreasing
hazard-rate function F ′(u)/ (1− F (u)) [Bhargava and Choudhary 2004; Fudenberg and Tirole. 1991].
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: 201x.
X:6 R. Gue´rin et al.
Table I. Notation
xi(t) adoption level of (unbundled) service i at time t
x(t) adoption level of service bundle at time t
x∗i , x
∗ equilibria adoption level for service i and bundle
(U1, U2) random (unbundled) service affinities
U = U1 + U2 affinity for service bundle
(e1, e2) externality for (unbundled) services 1, 2
e = e1 + e2 externality for service bundle
(c1, c2) costs for adopting (unbundled) services 1, 2
c = c1 + c2 costs for adopting service bundle
(V1, V2) utility function for (unbundled) services 1, 2
V = V1 + V2 utility function for service bundle
hi(xi) = P(Vi(xi) > 0) probability of adoption of (unbundled) services 1, 2
h(x) = P(V (x) > 0) probability of adoption of service bundle
li =
ci−1
ei
left adoption threshold for (unbundled) services 1, 2
ri =
ci
ei
right adoption threshold for (unbundled) services 1, 2
l = c−2
e
left adoption threshold for service bundle
m = c−1
e
middle adoption threshold for service bundle
r = c
e
right adoption threshold for service bundle
ρ correlation parameter for (U1, U2) in (16)
p distribution parameter for (U1, U2) in (5)
n population size for Monte-Carlo simulations
complexity. Furthermore, while they quantitatively affect adoption outcomes, i.e., if and
when bundling is beneficial, the qualitative findings of the paper still hold, and in particular
the importance of the joint distribution (correlation) of service affinities in the efficacy of
bundling.
As with separate offerings, equilibria satisfy
h(x∗) = P(U > c− ex∗) = x∗. (4)
Our question can now be restated more formally: how do adoption equilibria (x∗, x∗) under
bundling compare with adoption equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2) when services are offered separately?
It remains to specify the joint distribution of service affinities (values a user assigns to each
service) (U1, U2). In Section 4 we consider the case where (U1, U2) are uniform continuous
random variables, while in Section 5 we assume that (U1, U2) are uniform discrete (Bernoulli)
random variables. Table I lists commonly used notation.
4. CONTINUOUS AFFINITIES
In this section, we assume (U1, U2) are continuous uniform random variables on [0, 1]. This
assumption is sufficient to characterize the equilibria under separate service offerings, which
we do in Section 4.1. The equilibria under bundled service offerings, however, depend upon
the correlation between (U1, U2), since the bundled affinity depends upon U = U1 + U2.
A distribution on (U1, U2) with a parameterized correlation is presented in Section 4.2,
but is difficult to work with in its general form7. Consequently, we investigate the three
special cases where (U1, U2) are perfectly positively (Section 4.3) and negatively (Section 4.4)
correlated, and independent (Section 4.5). The intent is to illustrate that different types of
outcomes arise at the two correlation extremes, and confirm the difficulties associated with
capturing the impact of intermediate correlation values when using continuous distributions.
This then motivates the more tractable discrete model of Section 5, wherein we are able
to more explicitly explore the impact of varying correlation. Numerical investigations are
then used in Section 6.2 to verify that findings obtained with the simpler discrete model
also hold under the continuous model.
7See [Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009, Section 2] for a related discussion on the difficulty of using uniform
distributions to study the impact of correlation on bundling.
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4.1. Separate offerings
The following proposition characterizes the possible equilibria for separate service offerings
when the user service affinities are uniform random variables.
Proposition 4.1. When Ui (i ∈ {1, 2}) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the probability
of user adoption of service i in Eq. (2) becomes
hi(xi) =
{
0, xi ≤ li
eixi + 1− ci, li < xi ≤ ri
1, ri > xi
(5)
for adoption thresholds li ≡ ci−1ei and ri ≡
ci
ei
. The three possible equilibria are x∗i ∈ {0, (1−
ci)/(1− ei), 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are:
0 is stable eq. ⇔ ci > 1
1− ci
1− ei is stable eq. ⇔ ei < ci < 1
1− ci
1− ei is unstable eq. ⇔ 1 < ei < ci
1 is stable eq. ⇔ ei > ci
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (ci, ei) is
0 is lseq. ⇔ ci > 1
1− ci
1− ei is lseq. ⇔ ei < ci < 1
1 is lseq. ⇔ ci < min{ei, 1}
The proof of Prop. 4.1 is straightforward and is omitted. Note that the equilibria condi-
tions are a cover but not a partition of the (ci, ei) plane, while the lseq. conditions are a
partition of the (ci, ei) plane (see Fig. 6 in the appendix for an illustration). Note also that
the notion of lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) is natural is our setting, where we consider
services that have an initial adoption level of 0 when first offered, i.e., xi(0) = 0, so that the
lseq. will be the achieved equilibrium. The conditions on the equilibria are also intuitive:
zero adoption results when the costs are high, full adoption results when the externality
effect outweighs the cost, and partial adoption results when costs are low but outweigh the
externality effect.
4.2. Bundling under general correlation
The equilibria under bundled service offerings with continuous uniform affinities (U1, U2)
depend upon the correlation between them. There are many ways to generate random
variables with parametrized correlation. We rely on a standard approach [Pearson 1907;
Hotelling and Pabst 1936] (see the Appendix, Section A.1 for details) to generate a pair of
uniform random variables (U1, U2) with correlation coefficient ρ for any value ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
The approach uses a pair of independent standard normal random variables as its starting
point, so that the joint distribution FU1,U2(u1, u2), the distribution of the aggregate service
affinity FU (u) for U = U1 + U2, and the resulting probability of adoption h(x), can all be
described in terms of the standard normal CDF FZ .
As seen in the Appendix, the resulting expressions are, in general, rather unwieldy, and for
illustration purposes, we restate below the expression for h(x) that can be used to determine
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adoption equilibria.
h(x) =


0, x ≤ l
2− (c− ex)−
∫
1
c−ex−1
FZ
(
F−1Z (c− ex− v)− ρF
−1
Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv, l < x ≤ m
1−
∫ c−ex
0
FZ
(
F−1Z (c− ex− v)− ρF
−1
Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv, m < x ≤ r
1, r < x
(6)
for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2
e
, m ≡ c−1
e
, and r ≡ c
e
.
The equilibria under bundling are the solutions of h(x) = x. As evident from Eq. (6), this
is a difficult equation to work with. This motivates focusing on the three specific cases of
perfect positive (U1 = U2) and negative (U1 = 1−U2) correlation, as well as independence,
i.e., ρ ∈ {−1, 0,+1}.
4.3. Perfect positive correlation
Specializing for ρ = 1 Props. A.4 and A.6 of the Appendix yields the joint and sum distri-
butions for uniform random variables (U1, U2) satisfying U1 = U2, and thus U = U1 +U2 is
uniform over [0, 2]:
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = min{u1, u2} fU1,U2(u1, u2) = 1u1=u2
FU (u) = u/2, u ∈ [0, 2] fU (u) = 1/2, u ∈ [0, 2].
Because the aggregate affinity is uniformly distributed on [0, 2], the resulting equilibria are
of the same form as in Prop. 4.1 after replacing ei and ci by e/2 and c/2, respectively. Thus
we have the following corollary to Prop. A.9 and Prop. 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. The probability of bundle adoption h(x) in Prop. A.9 under aggregate
affinity U = U1 + U2 formed from perfectly positively correlated uniform affinities (U1, U2)
satisfying U1 = U2 is
h(x) =
{
0, x ≤ l
e
2x+ 1− c2 , l < x ≤ r
1, r < x
(7)
The three possible equilibria are x∗ ∈ {0, (2 − c)/(2 − e), 1}. The conditions for each equi-
librium (eq.) are:
0 is stable eq.⇔ c > 2, 1 is stable eq.⇔ e > c
2− c
2− e is stable eq.⇔ e < c < 2,
2− c
2− e is unstable eq.⇔ 2 < e < c
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (c, e) is
0 is lseq.⇔ c > 2, 2− c
2− e is lseq.⇔ e < c < 2, 1 is lseq.⇔ c < min{e, 2}
The next part of the analysis is to compare the lowest stable equilibria under sepa-
rate ((x∗1, x
∗
2)) and bundled ((x
∗, x∗)) offerings as a function of the system parameters
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(e1, e2, c1, c2). The results are shown below.
0 2−c
2−e
1
c > 2 e < c < 2 c < e ∧ 2
(0, 0) c1 > 1 c2 > 1 SS WW WW
True False False(
0, 1−c2
1−e2
)
c1 > 1 e2 < c2 < 1 SL WL or WW WW
(0, 1) c1 > 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 SL WL WS(
1−c1
1−e1
, 0
)
e1 < c1 < 1 c2 > 1 LS LW or WW WW
(1, 0) c1 < e1 ∧ 1 c2 > 1 LS LW SW(
1−c1
1−e1
, 1−c2
1−e2
)
e1 < c1 < 1 e2 < c2 < 1 LL WL or LW WW
False False(
1−c1
1−e1
, 1
)
e1 < c1 < 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 LL WL WS
False(
1, 1−c2
1−e2
)
c1 < e1 ∧ 1 e2 < c2 < 1 LL LW SW
False
(1, 1) c1 < e1 ∧ 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 LL LL SS
False False True
The nine rows are lowest stable equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2) under separate offerings, with x
∗
i ∈{0, (1 − ci)/(1 − ei), 1} for i ∈ {1, 2}. The third column corresponds to the lowest stable
equilibria (x∗, x∗) under bundling with x∗ ∈ {0, (2− c)/(2−e), 1}. Each combination of row
and third column entry, say (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗), is a possible equilibrium triple without and with
bundling. The second column gives the conditions on (c1, c2, e1, e2) for each (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) to be
the lowest stable equilibria under separate offerings, and the second row of the third column
gives the conditions on (c, e) for each x∗ to be the lowest stable equilibria under bundling.
Each third column entry is labeled with a pair of letters (∆1,∆2) with ∆i ∈ {L, S,W} for
i ∈ {1, 2} representing (L)ose, (S)ame, and (W)in, and denoting the change in equilibrium
under bundling for that service. For example, SL means the equilibrium for service 1 stayed
the same (x∗1 = x
∗), while the equilibrium for service 2 decreased (x∗2 > x
∗). The notation
a ∧ b in the inequalities in the second column, simply means that the inequality needs to
be satisfied for both a “AND” b. The word “True” indicates the equilibrium for the column
always results for the equilibria in the corresponding row, e.g., when c1 > 1 and c2 > 1, the
bundled equilibrium 0 always result for the separate equilibria (0, 0) because the conditions
on c1 and c2 imply c > 2. Conversely, the word “False” indicates the equilibrium for the
column is never feasible for the equilibria in the corresponding row.
There are nine possible tuples. Under perfectly positively correlated user valuations, the
bundle’s valuation is essentially a weighted sum of the valuations of the individual services,
so that most outcomes involve a trade-off between improving (or maintaining) the adoption
of one service and worsening (or maintaining) that of the other. Of note is the fact that a
LL outcome is not feasible. This is because, a bundle equilibrium of 0 only arises when the
less valuable service also has an equilibrium of 0 when offered alone, which results in a SL
(or LS) outcome. Because of the effect of externalities, the converse is, however not true,
i.e., WW outcomes can be realized.
WW outcomes typically arise when one technology has a high adoption cost together
with a high externality factor, while the other technology enjoys middling cost and exter-
nality factor. In such cases, the first technology could be tremendously successful, if only it
managed to acquire enough of a user base to unleash the value its strong externality factor
can deliver. However, its high adoption cost makes this nearly impossible. Hence, when
offered alone, this technology never takes off. In contrast, the relatively low adoption cost
of the other technology enables it to make rapid initial progress even when offered alone.
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Its initial adoption spurt, however, quickly subsides as its externality contributions do not
progress fast enough to keep attracting more users. This translates in neither technology
experiencing meaningful success when offered alone. Bundling can, however, change this.
When the two technologies are bundled, the second becomes the engine that drives initial
adoption until enough of a user-base has been built to allow the first technology to cross
its critical adoption threshold. At that point, the roles reverse and the first technology
becomes the main driver for continued adoption, as its strong externality contribution is
now sufficient to attract more users. The bundle’s adoption then takes off, possibly reaching
full penetration. In the process, the second technology also reaches a level of adoption it
would never have realized on its own.
4.4. Perfect negative correlation
Specializing for ρ = −1 Props. A.4 and A.6 of the Appendix yields the joint and sum
distributions for uniform random variables (U1, U2) satisfying U = U1 + U2 = 1:
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = max{u1 + u2 − 1, 0} fU1,U2(u1, u2) = 1u1+u2=1
FU (u) = 1u≥1 fU (u) = 1u=1.
The case of perfect negative correlation is simpler to analyze than the case of perfect positive
correlation. All users now see the same utility of 1 + ex − c for the bundle. The following
corollary of Prop. A.9 shows that when c < 1 all users immediately adopt, while seeding
to an adoption level of x = c − 1 is needed to ensure full adoption when e > c − 1, and
adoption is never feasible when e < c− 1.
Corollary 4.3. The probability of bundle adoption h(x) in Prop. A.9 under aggregate
affinity U = U1 + U2 formed from perfectly negatively correlated uniform affinities (U1, U2)
satisfying U1 + U2 = 1 is
h(x) =
{
0, x < m
1, x ≥ m (8)
The two possible equilibria (eq.) are x∗ ∈ {0, 1}, with conditions for each:
0 is stable eq.⇔ c > 1, 1 is stable eq.⇔ e > c− 1
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (c, e) is
0 is lseq.⇔ c > 1, 1 is lseq.⇔ c < 1
We next compare the lowest stable equilibria without ((x∗1, x
∗
2)) and with ((x
∗, x∗)) bundling
as a function of the system parameters (e1, e2, c1, c2). In general, under perfect negative
correlation, the overall cost of the bundle is the dominant factor in determining whether
bundling is beneficial. As shown, below, this yields very different outcomes when compared
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to the case of perfect positive correlation.
0 1
c > 1 c < 1
(0, 0) c1 > 1 c2 > 1 SS WW
True False(
0, 1−c2
1−e2
)
c1 > 1 e2 < c2 < 1 SL WW
True False
(0, 1) c1 > 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 SL WS
True False(
1−c1
1−e1
, 0
)
e1 < c1 < 1 c2 > 1 LS WW
True False
(1, 0) c1 < e2 ∧ 1 c2 > 1 LS SW
True False(
1−c1
1−e1
, 1−c2
1−e2
)
e1 < c1 < 1 e2 < c2 < 1 LL WW(
1−c1
1−e1
, 1
)
e1 < c1 < 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 LL WS(
1, 1−c2
1−e2
)
c1 < e2 ∧ 1 e2 < c2 < 1 LL SW
(1, 1) c1 < e1 ∧ 1 c2 < e2 ∧ 1 LL SS
First, seven rather than eight of the nine equilibrium change pairs (∆1,∆2) are possible.
The two missing entries areWL and LW (as opposed to LL for perfect positive correlation),
i.e., it is not possible for the adoption levels of the two services to simultaneously increase
and decrease, respectively. Second, if either equilibrium under separate offerings is zero then
the bundled equilibrium is zero, i.e., both services must be individually viable for a bundled
offering to succeed. Again, this is unlike the perfect positive correlation case, where pairing a
service that was not viable on its own with a more successful one, could result in a non-zero
adoption for the bundle (and even in some cases in a WW outcome). Third, when both
equilibria under separate offerings are nonzero, the bundled equilibria may be better than
or equal to both equilibria, or may be worse than or equal to both equilibria. For example,
the separate offering equilibria pair (x∗1, x
∗
2) = ((1 − c1)/(1 − e1), (1 − c2)/(1 − e2)) (which
requires e1 < c1 < 1 and e2 < c2 < 1) may yield a bundled equilibria of (0, 0) if c > 1 or
(1, 1) if c < 1. In the case of perfect positive correlation, the bundle equilibrium is always
at some intermediate value between the two stand-alone equilibria.
The next section considers the intermediate configuration of independent affinities in an
attempt to explore when and how changes occur between those two extremes.
4.5. Independent affinities
Specialization for ρ = 0 of Props. A.4 and A.6 in the Appendix yields the joint and sum
distributions for independent uniform random variables:
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = u1u2 fU1,U2(u1, u2) = 1
FU (u) =
{
u2
2 , 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
1− (2−u)22 , 1 < u ≤ 2
fU (u) =
{
u, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
2− u, 1 < u ≤ 2 .
This yields the following corollary to Prop. A.9 of the Appendix.
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Corollary 4.4. Under aggregate affinity U formed from independent uniform affinities
(U1, U2) with distribution FU (.), the probability of bundle adoption h(x) is:
h(x) =


0, x ≤ l
1
2 (2− (c− ex))2, l < x ≤ m
1
2 (2− (c− ex)2), m < x ≤ r
1, r < x
(9)
which is convex increasing on l < x ≤ m and concave increasing on m < x ≤ r (recall
h(m) = 1/2). Besides x∗ ∈ {0, 1}, the possible equilibria in (0, 1) are:
x∗ ∈


ξ∗l,± ≡ 1e2
(
(c− 2)e+ 1±
√
2(c− 2)e+ 1
)
, l < x∗ ≤ m
ξ∗r,± ≡ 1e2
(
ce− 1±
√
2(e− c)e+ 1
)
, m < x∗ ≤ r
(10)
The regions on the (c, e) plane where these equilibria exist are
Rl,± = {(c, e) : max{l, 0} ≤ ξ∗l,± ≤ min{m, 1}}
Rr,± = {(c, e) : max{m, 0} ≤ ξ∗r,± ≤ min{r, 1}}
Proof. The first two derivatives of h(x) are
h′(x) =
{
e(2− (c− ex)), l < x ≤ m
e(c− ex), m < x ≤ r , h
′′
(x) =
{
e2, l < x ≤ m
−e2, m < x ≤ r
The equilibria are the solutions of h(x) = x, i.e.,
1
2
(2− (c− ex))2 = x ⇔ e2x2 − 2((c− 2)e+ 1)x+ (c− 2)2 = 0, l < x ≤ m
1
2
(2− (c− ex)2) = x ⇔ e2x2 − 2(ce− 1)x+ (c2 − 2) = 0, m < x ≤ r
The solutions are given by Eq. (10).
An explicit comparison of the equilibria with and without bundling as in the two previous
sections appears to be complicated. Without bundling, the equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2) are such that
x∗i depends upon (ci, ei) as in Prop. 4.1. With bundling, the equilibria (x
∗, x∗) is such that
x∗ depends upon (c, e) (where c = c1 + c2 and e = e1 + e2) as in Cor. 4.4. Fig. 7 in
the Appendix illustrates the complex shapes of the bundled equilibria regions even in this
relatively simple case of independent affinities.
4.6. Summary
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 hint at a transition in the impact of correlation on bundling. Section 4.5
unfortunately illustrates that while a direct analysis is feasible, it is cumbersome, which
makes extracting insight into when bundling can improve adoption challenging. As a result,
the next section introduces a discrete affinity model that preserves users’ heterogeneity,
but allows us to explicitly explore the impact of correlation. Section 6.2 assesses through
numerical investigations the robustness of the results obtained using this simplified discrete
model.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: 201x.
Adoption of bundled services with network externalities and correlated affinities X:13
5. DISCRETE AFFINITIES
In this section, we model user affinities as a pair of Bernoulli random variables (U1, U2) ∈
{0, 1}2 with joint distribution parameterized by p ∈ [0, 1]:
U1\U2 0 1
0 (1− p)/2 p/2 1/2
1 p/2 (1− p)/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
The user population consists of four types: negative affinities for both services (0, 0), positive
affinities for both services (1, 1), and mixed service affinities (0, 1) and (1, 0). Note the
marginals are independent of the parameter p, and are in fact uniform, i.e., P(U1 = 1) =
P(U2 = 1) = 1/2. Thus, exactly half of the population has a positive affinity for each
service, regardless of p. Although the discrete model is a simplification of the continuous
model of Section 4, it facilitates study of the impact of correlation in user service affinities.
The correlation between (U1, U2) is
ρ =
E[U1U2]− E[U1]E[U2]√
Var(U1)Var(U2)
=
1−p
2 − 12 × 12√
1
4 × 14
= 1− 2p,
which ranges from ρ = −1 for p = 1 (all users have mixed affinities, p01 = p10 = 1/2)
up to ρ = +1 for p = 0 (all users’ affinities are either both positive or both negative,
p00 = p11 = 1/2).
5.1. Separate offerings
The probability of a user adopting service i ∈ {1, 2} under separate service offerings and
the resulting equilibria are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. When Ui is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, the probability of user
adoption of service i in Eq. (2) becomes
hi(xi) =


0, xi ≤ li
1
2 , li < xi ≤ ri
1, ri < xi
(11)
for adoption thresholds li ≡ ci−1ei and ri ≡ ciei . The three possible equilibria are x∗i ∈
{0, 1/2, 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are:
0 is stable eq. ⇔ 1 ≤ ci
1
2 is stable eq. ⇔ 2(ci − 1) ≤ ei ≤ 2ci
1 is stable eq. ⇔ ci ≤ ei
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (ci, ei) is
0 is lseq. ⇔ ci ≥ 1
1
2 is lseq. ⇔ ci ≤ 1 and ei ≤ 2ci
1 is lseq. ⇔ ci ≤ 1 and ei ≥ 2ci
The proof of Prop. 5.1 is straightforward and is omitted. All seven nonempty subsets of
{0, 1/2, 1} may coexist as equilibria, and all equilibria are stable. If costs are high (ci ≥ 1)
then no adoption is possible; likewise if the externality is high (ei ≥ ci) then full adoption
is possible. Intermediate-level (x∗i = 1/2) adoption is possible for externalities that are
moderate with respect to the cost.
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5.2. Bundled offerings
The probability of a user adopting a bundled service offering and the resulting equilibria
are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. When (U1, U2) are distributed on {0, 1}2 according to Eq. (5) with
parameter p ∈ [0, 1] and correlation ρ = 1− 2p ∈ [−1, 1], the probability of user adoption of
the bundle in Eq. (4) becomes
h(x) =


0, x ≤ l
1+ρ
4 , l < x ≤ m
3−ρ
4 , m < x ≤ r
1, r < x
, (12)
for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2
e
, m ≡ c−1
e
, r ≡ c
e
. The four possible equilibria are x∗ ∈
{0, (1 + ρ)/4, (3− ρ)/4, 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are:
0 is stable eq. ⇔ c ≥ 2
1+ρ
4 is stable eq. ⇔ 4(c−2)1+ρ ≤ e ≤ 4(c−1)1+ρ
3−ρ
4 is stable eq. ⇔ 4(c−1)3−ρ ≤ e ≤ 4c3−ρ
1 is stable eq. ⇔ c ≤ e
(13)
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (ci, ei) is
0 is lseq. ⇔ c ≥ 2
1+ρ
4 is lseq. ⇔ c < 2 and 0 ≤ e ≤ 4(c−1)1+ρ
3−ρ
4 is lseq. ⇔ c < 2 and 4(c−1)1+ρ < e ≤ 4c3−ρ
1 is lseq. ⇔ c < 2 and e > max
{
4c
3−ρ ,
4(c−1)
1+ρ
} (14)
Proof. Conditioning on (U1, U2) gives the user adoption probability as:
h(x) = P(V (x) > 0) = P(U > c− ex)
= P(U > c− ex|(U1, U2) = (0, 0))P((U1, U2) = (0, 0)) +
P(U > c− ex|(U1, U2) = (0, 1))P((U1, U2) = (0, 1)) +
P(U > c− ex|(U1, U2) = (1, 0))P((U1, U2) = (1, 0)) +
P(U > c− ex|(U1, U2) = (1, 1))P((U1, U2) = (1, 1))
=
1− p
2
P(ex > c) +
p
2
P(1 + ex > c) +
p
2
P(1 + ex > c) +
1− p
2
P(2 + ex > c)
=
1− p
2
1x>l + p1x>m +
1− p
2
1x>r (15)
The characterization of the equilibria and the lseq. are straightforward and are omitted.
As with separate offerings, no adoption is possible if costs are high (c ≥ 2), and full
adoption is possible if the externality is high (e ≥ c). The intermediate equilibria (1 +
ρ)/4, (3 − ρ)/4 are possible when the externality is moderate with respect to the cost. Of
interest is identifying regions where bundling yields a higher adoption equilibirium, i.e.,
WW scenarios, and and in particular how this outcome may be affected by ρ. Exploring
this issue is the topic of Section 5.3.
5.3. Bundling’s impact on equilibria
There are 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 possible lseq. combinations ((x∗1, x∗2), x∗) where (x∗1, x∗2) is the
separate offering lowest equilibria, and x∗ is the bundling lowest equilibrium. The table of
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BunEq ⇒ 0
1+ρ
4
3−ρ
4
1
c > 2 c < 2 c < 2 c < 2
(1 + ρ)e < 4(c − 1) (1 + ρ)e > 4(c − 1) (1 + ρ)e > 4(c − 1)
SepEq SepEq conditions (3 − ρ)e < 4c (3 − ρ)e > 4c
(0, 0) c1 > 1 c2 > 1 SS WW WW WW
True False False False
(0, 1/2) c1 > 1 c2 < 1 SL WL WW WW
e2 < 2c2
(0, 1) c1 > 1 c2 < 1 SL WL WL WS
e2 > 2c2
(1/2, 0) c1 < 1 c2 > 1 LS LW WW WW
e1 < 2c1
(1, 0) c1 < 1 c2 > 1 LS LW LW SW
e1 > 2c1
(1/2, 1/2) c1 < 1 c2 < 1 LL LL WW WW
e1 < 2c1 e2 < 2c2 False
(1/2, 1) c1 < 1 c2 < 1 LL LL WL WS
e1 < 2c1 e2 > 2c2 False
(1, 1/2) c1 < 1 c2 < 1 LL LL LW SW
e1 > 2c1 e2 < 2c1 False
(1, 1) c1 < 1 c2 < 1 LL LL LL SS
e1 > 2c1 e2 > 2c1 False
Fig. 1. Rows: equilibria under separate offerings; Columns: equilibria under bundling.
Individual table entries show changes in equilibrium under bundling (Same, Win, Lose) for each service and
whether they can occur (True/False).
Fig. 1 lists all 36 combinations and identifies the conditions under which each holds and
whether bundling is beneficial or not. As in Section 4, equilibria under separate offerings
form the rows, while the four equilibria under bundling form the (left-most) columns. The
row headings (second column) give the requirements on (c1, c2, e1, e2) for a particular pair of
separate offering lower equilibria. The column headings (second row) give the requirements
on (c, e, ρ) for a particular bundled equilibrium to be the lowest equilibrium.
Individual entries in the table identify how bundled equilibria compare to equilibria under
separate offerings, i.e., as before a “win” (W), a “Loss” (L), or the “Same” (S), and whether
individual combinations are feasible (True) or not (False). Note that in several instances,
row and column conditions are redundant, e.g., c1 > 1 and c2 > 1 obviously imply c > 2, so
that simplifications are possible. For clarity of presentation, we omit specifying those more
compact requirements in the table.
Several observations follow from the table, and in particular how ρ affects the emergence
of WW combinations. Of note is that the configurations that yield WW outcomes are
qualitatively consistent with those of Section 4.3, e.g., combining a low-cost, low externality
technology, with a high-cost, high externality one can improve adoption for both. The table,
however, also reveals a more ambivalent role for ρ than the two extreme configurations of
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 seemed to indicate. In particular, consider the conditions (1 + ρ)e >
4(c − 1) and (3 − ρ)e > 4c that are required to hold for 1 to be an equilibrium under
bundling. Increasing (decreasing) ρ makes it easier (harder) for the first condition to be
met, but is clearly detrimental (beneficial) to the second. Similarly, varying ρ can also allow
the emergence of WW scenarios present in Section 4.4 but not 4.3, i.e., combining two
middling technologies, (x∗1, x
∗
2) = (1/2, 1/2), can benefit both under certain conditions. The
next section investigates this more extensively.
Other observations are also possible from the table, and we summarize next some of the
more relevant ones. First, if (0, 0) is the separate offering equilibrium then 0 is the bundled
equilibrium, i.e., bundling cannot help. This is because c1 > 1 and c2 > 1 implies c > 2.
Second, if (1, 1) is the separate offering equilibrium, then it is possible for the bundled
equilibrium to be either (1 + ρ)/4 or (3− ρ)/4, i.e., bundling can result in an LL outcome.
Third, if the separate offering equilibria are both non-zero, then bundling cannot cause the
equilibrium to drop to zero, but it can cause it to drop (to (1 + ρ)/4, which can be made
arbitrarily close to 0). This happens when (1+ ρ)e < 4(c− 1), i.e., when the bundle cost is
relatively large (c > 1) and when the correlation coefficient ρ is small enough. Fourth, if the
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separate offering equilibria are both below one but at least one is non-zero, then bundling
can increase the equilibrium to (3 − ρ)/4 or 1, provided the bundle’s cost is not too high
(c < 2). For example, when the separate offerings equilibria are (0, 1/2), the bundled offering
equilibrium is either (3 − ρ)/4 or 1 provided c < 2 and (1 + ρ)e > 4(c − 1). In the next
section, we explore further the impact that ρ has on the potential benefits that bundling
can yield.
6. GUIDELINES AND INTERPRETATIONS
The traditional “wisdom” in developing bundling strategies, e.g., see [Venkatesh and Maha-
jan 2009], is that bundling is typically most effective in the presence of negative correlation
in user valuations (reservation prices). The intuition is that bundling reduces heterogeneity
in users’ valuations, which facilitates the selection of a “price” for a bundled offering that
results in an overall higher profit (see [Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009, Section 2.3]).
There are obviously differences between the profit maximization goal of traditional
bundling strategies, and our goal of maximizing adoption given a fixed adoption cost that
will typically be different from the price that would optimize profit8. The other important
difference between our formulation and that of traditional bundling strategies is the pres-
ence of externalities. Hence, we can expect both factors to contribute to possible differences
in outcomes, with the latter (presence of externalities) likely to have a stronger influence.
In particular, it is relatively easy to see from Eqs. (1) and (3) that without externalities,
assessing whether bundling benefits adoption is straightforward. Specifically, when services
are offered separately, adoption levels are simply equal to 1− F1(c1) and 1− F2(c2), where
Fi(x) is the CDF of users’ valuation for service i. Conversely, the adoption level of the bundle
is given by 1 − F (c1 + c2), where F (x) is the CDF of the random variable U = U1 + U2
that captures the cumulative valuation of the two services to a (random) user). Hence, in
the absence of externalities, whether bundling is beneficial (improves overall adoption) or
not is solely a function of how the bundle’s cost compares to the cost of individual services.
On the other hand, as the models of both Sections 4 and 5 revealed, more complex
behaviors emerge when externalities are present. In particular, the models revealed that
WW outcomes can arise under two general scenarios. The first involves bundling a service
with a high externality factor and a high adoption cost, with a second service that enjoys
middling cost and externality factor. Alternatively, WW outcomes may also arise from
bundling two middling services that alone cannot create sufficient externality value to reach
a high level of adoption, but which together could. In both cases, correlation (ρ) in how
individual users value the services can affect the outcome.
6.1. On the role of correlation (discrete model)
The impact of ρ is illustrated in Fig. 2 that plots as a function of ρ ∈ [−1, 1], the adoption
level of a technology bundle for different instances of the two above scenarios under the
discrete correlation model of Section 5.
Specifically, the upper part of Fig. 2 displays adoption levels when bundling two hetero-
geneous technologies. Technology 1 has a high cost, c1 = 4/3, which prevents it from taking
off on its own, i.e., its stand-alone adoption remains at x∗1 = 0, irrespective of its externality
factor e1. Technology 2 has a low cost, c2 = 1/3, but marginal externality, e2 = 1/3, so that
x∗2 = 1/2. Combining the two technologies can benefit both, but only when the externality
e1 of technology 1 is high enough, i.e., e1 ≥ 5/3 (three right most plots). When e1 is low,
i.e., e1 ≤ 1, technology 1 still benefits from being bundled with technology 2, but the reverse
is not true (x∗ ≤ 1/2). More interesting though than the impact of e1 in creating a WW
outcome, is the role of ρ.
8This is not to say that it is not if interest to explore how changes in cost, e.g., through incentives, affect
adoption, but this aspect is beyond the focus of this initial investigation.
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Fig. 2. Impact of value correlation (ρ) on bundle adoption (x∗) for different technology combinations
(discrete model).
Specifically, when e1 is large enough, the benefits of bundling arise only once ρ exceeds
a certain threshold. This is because early adopters of the bundle are driven primarily by
the second technology, and under highly negative correlation in technology valuations, the
first technology contributes added cost but little or no added value to those early adopters.
Hence, adoption stops quickly at a level below that of the second technology offered alone.
As correlation increases, the number of early adopters that derive positive utility from
adopting the bundle increases to a point where adoption can reach enough of a critical
mass to allow the externality effect of the first technology to become effective. This allows
adoption to increase beyond what the second technology alone would have realized.
Note though that further increases in correlation need not yield additional improvements.
As a matter of fact, increasing ρ beyond the threshold can lower adoption (second plot from
the left, e1 = 5/3). This is because as correlation increases, the potential adoption “base” of
the bundle narrows (both technologies appeal to an increasingly similar set of users), which
limits the adoption equilibrium that can be reached. This effect persists until the externality
factor of technology 1 is strong enough to allow the bundle to reach full adoption (third
and fourth plots from the left for e1 = 7/3, 3). As the externality factor of technology 1
continues increasing, its strength becomes sufficient to preserve full adoption for some range
of ρ beyond the initial threshold. Further increases of ρ outside that range can, however,
result in the adoption level of the bundle dropping again (third plot from the left, e1 = 7/3).
This is only avoided once the externality factor of the first technology is strong enough that
the range of ρ values for which no decline in bundle’s adoption occurs extends all the way
to ρ = 1 (right-most plot for e1 = 3).
Conversely, the lower part of Fig. 2 considers the bundling of two “middling” technologies,
which alone only realize a relatively low adoption level x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1/2. They both have
reasonably low costs, c1 = 3/4, c2 = 1/2, and can benefit from bundling when their combined
externality factor, e = e1+ e2 is high enough. The four plots display (left to right) adoption
as a function of ρ and for increasing values of e (e2 = 3/4 and e1 varies from 0 to 3/2). They
offer a qualitatively similar behavior as the upper part of Fig. 2, albeit with a more limited
range, e.g., WL outcomes can be eliminated (if ρ is high enough) and decreases in adoption
as ρ keeps increasing cannot be avoided. This is not unexpected since the constraint that
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1/2 limits the range of costs and externality factors permissible.
In the next section, we explore the extent to which the above conclusions remain quali-
tatively valid under the more general model of continuous affinities of Section 4.
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Fig. 3. Impact of value correlation (ρ) on bundle adoption (x∗) for different technology combinations
(continuous model).
6.2. On the role of correlation (continuous model)
The discrete affinity model of Section 5 let us explicitly account for the impact of correla-
tion when bundling services. Its relative simplicity, however, raises the question of whether
the findings hold under more general (realistic) assumptions. An exhaustive assessment is
clearly impractical, and we limit ourselves to the uniform distribution of Section 4 to offer
initial evidence of the “robustness” of the results. Because, as mentioned in Section 4.5,
an analytical investigation of uniformly distributed affinities under general correlation is
complex, we resort to a numerical approach. Specifically, we consider a pair of bundling
scenarios similar to those of Fig. 2, and numerically evaluate the bundle’s adoption for dif-
ferent values of ρ. The results are reported in Fig. 3, which largely mirrors Fig. 2 with some
differences as we briefly review.
The two sets of plots in Fig. 3 clearly display the presence of a threshold effect, where
correlation (ρ) needs to exceed a certain minimum value before bundling becomes ben-
eficial. This is particularly so when combining two heterogeneous services; a high-cost,
high-externality one with a low-cost, low-externality one (top set of plots). Unlike the cor-
responding scenario in Fig. 2, the jump in the bundle’s adoption that occurs after crossing
the threshold is not followed by a decline in adoption as ρ further increases. This is likely
because under a uniform distribution, the relative value of the externality after crossing
the threshold is sufficient to prevent declines in adoption for larger values of ρ, i.e., a sce-
nario similar to that of the top right-most plot of Fig. 2. The potentially negative impact
of further increases in ρ (beyond the threshold) is, however, seen in the lower set of plots
of Fig. 3. In particular, the right-most plot clearly displays that while ρ needs to exceed a
threshold value of about −0.4 for the bundle to jump to full adoption (x∗ = 1), increasing
ρ beyond this value results in progressively lower adoptions levels.
We note that the last scenario is an instance of a SW rather than a trueWW scenario, and
under continuous affinity distributions we did not identify instances of true WW outcomes
that exhibited a decline in adoption as ρ increased beyond its “threshold” value. This is not
unexpected, since as mentioned earlier, the shape of the joint distribution and not just the
correlation coefficient is expected to affect the outcome. Hence, as distributions change, so
will the exact configurations under which different effects arise as well as their magnitude.
However, we believe that the general insight articulated in the previous section still holds,
namely, the presence of a minimum correlation value to realize the critical mass of early
adopters that a bundle with a high externality factor needs to succeed, and the fact that
increasing ρ beyond this value can narrow the bundle’s ultimate user base and, therefore,
lower overall adoption unless its externality factor is large enough.
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6.3. Summary
Based on the above results, the following bundling guidelines emerge to assist in identifying
services, which, if bundled, can result in WW outcomes:
Bundling guidelines: When bundling network services so as to bolster their adoption, it
is best to choose services that are
(1) (a) either heterogeneous in their cost-benefit structure, i.e., low cost & externality
vs. high cost & externality,
(b) or of average cost and externality,
(2) and sufficiently correlated in how users value them, but not too much.
The first guideline highlights that successful bundling outcomes require both a high overall
externality factor, and a low enough cost to allow the creation of a sufficient critical mass of
early adopters so that the value of the high externality can start being realized. The second
guideline states that creating a sufficient critical mass of early adopters requires a certain
minimum level of correlation in how users value the bundled services, but that once this
level has been reached there is no benefit in selecting services that exhibit higher levels of
correlation (and there could be disadvantages).
7. CONCLUSION
The paper presents an initial investigation aimed at developing a better understanding of
when bundling networking technologies or services can be beneficial, i.e., result in higher
adoption levels than when they are offered separately.
The question is of relevance in many practical settings as networking technologies com-
monly face early adoption hurdles until they acquire a large enough user-base to start
delivering sufficient value. Bundling technologies can offer an effective solution to overcome
those early adoption challenges, but it is often hard to predict whether it will succeed or
not. Of particular importance in determining the outcome is correlation in how users value
the individual technologies being bundled. The paper proposes simple models that can help
explore this question in a principled manner, and illustrates the type of insight they provide
through a few simple examples.
There are obviously many extensions that are desirable to the basic models described in
the paper and in their ability to realistically capture how technologies interact, e.g., the
extent to which they are complements or substitutes, or whether they exhibit economies of
scope. The methodology outlined in the paper, however, offers a first step towards devel-
oping a fundamental understanding of the role that bundling can play in helping network
technologies overcome initial adoption hurdles.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Generating and characterizing correlated random variables
The generation of a pair of correlated uniform random variables (U1, U2) is based on the
following proposition.
Proposition A.1 ([Pearson 1907; Hotelling and Pabst 1936]). Let (Z1, Z2) be
a pair of independent standard normal RVs and fix ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Then
[
Y1
Y2
]
= [ Z1 Z2 ]
[
1 ρ
0
√
1− ρ2
]
=
[
Z1
ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2
]
(16)
are standard normal RVs with correlation ρ. Further, U = (U1, U2) with Ui = FZ(Yi) for
i ∈ {1, 2} are uniform RVs with correlation
ρU =
6
pi
sin−1
(ρ
2
)
∈ [−1, 1]. (17)
Remark A.2. Selecting ρ = 2 sin(piρ∗/6) for a target correlation ρ∗ ensures ρU = ρ
∗. In
what follows we will work with ρ as the correlation parameter, even though ρU is the actual
correlation9.
Remark A.3. Observe A =
[
1 ρ
0
√
1− ρ2
]
in Prop. A.1 is the Cholesky decomposition
of the target correlation matrix Σ = ATA =
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
.
From Prop. A.1 it is immediate to obtain the joint CDF on (U1, U2) in terms of the
correlation ρ, and from there the joint PDF.
Proposition A.4. The joint CDF and joint PDF of (U1, U2) in Prop. A.1 at (u1, u2)
are:
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ u1
0
FZ
(
F−1Z (u2)− ρF−1Z (v1)√
1− ρ2
)
dv1 (18)
fU1,U2(u1, u2) =
1√
1− ρ2fZ(F−1Z (u2))
fZ
(
F−1Z (u2)− ρF−1Z (u1)√
1− ρ2
)
. (19)
9A further justification for this equivocation is the fact that ρU (ρ) ≈ ρ. In fact max |ρU (ρ)−ρ| over ρ ∈ [−1, 1]
occurs at ρc = ±
√
4pi2 − 36/pi ≈ ±0.593664 where ρU (ρc) = ± 6pi sin−1
(√
pi2 − 9/pi
)
≈ ±0.575581, so the
maximum deviation of ρU (ρ) from ρ is |ρU (ρc)− ρc| ≈ 0.01808.
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Proof. The joint CDF of (U1, U2) at (u1, u2) is:
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = P(U1 ≤ u1, U2 ≤ u2)
= P(FZ(Z1) ≤ u1, FZ(ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2) ≤ u2)
= P(Z1 ≤ F−1Z (u1), ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2 ≤ F−1Z (u2))
=
∫ F−1Z (u1)
−∞
P(Z1 ≤ F−1Z (u1), ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2 ≤ F−1Z (u2)|Z1 = z1)fZ(z1)dz1
=
∫ F−1Z (u1)
−∞
P(ρz1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2 ≤ F−1Z (u2))fZ(z1)dz1
=
∫ F−1Z (u1)
−∞
FZ
(
F−1Z (u2)− ρz1√
1− ρ2
)
fZ(z1)dz1 (20)
Change of variables from z1 to v1 = FZ(z1) gives Eq. (18). Differentiation w.r.t. (u1, u2)
gives
∂
∂u1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = FZ
(
F−1Z (u2)− ρF−1Z (u1)√
1− ρ2
)
(21)
fU1,U2(u1, u2) =
1√
1− ρ2 fZ
(
F−1Z (u2)− ρF−1Z (u1)√
1− ρ2
)
d
du2
F−1Z (u2)
Applying the inverse function theorem gives the joint PDF in Eq. (19).
The joint PDF fU1,U2(u1, u2) is illustrated in Fig. 4 for ρ ∈ ± 12 . The following propo-
sition shows that this joint distribution recovers the distributions of perfectly negatively
correlated, independent, and perfectly positively correlated uniform random variables as
ρ→ {−1, 0,+1}, respectively.
Proposition A.5. The limits of FU1,U2(u1, u2) for (u1, u2) ∈ [0, 1]2 in Eq. (19) as
ρ→ {−1, 0,+1} are
lim
ρ→−1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = max{u1 + u2 − 1, 0}
lim
ρ→0
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = u1u2
lim
ρ→1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) = min{u1, u2} (22)
corresponding to U1+U2 = 1 (a.s.), (U1, U2) independent, and U1 = U2 (a.s.), respectively.
Proof. Since the integral is over a finite support and the integrand is continuous:
lim
ρ→±1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ u1
0
FZ
(
lim
ρ→±1
F−1Z (u2)− ρF−1Z (v1)√
1− ρ2
)
dv1. (23)
It follows that FU1,U2(u1, u2) → u1u2 as ρ → 0. Next, as ρ → 1 observe as u2 ≷ v1 the
function inside FZ(·) in Eq. (23) goes to ±∞, respectively. Thus:
u1 < u2 ⇒ lim
ρ→1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ u1
0
FZ(∞)dv1 = u1
u1 > u2 ⇒ lim
ρ→1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ u2
0
FZ(∞)dv1 +
∫ u1
u2
FZ(−∞)dv1 = u2 (24)
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Fig. 4. Contour plots (top) and 3-D plots (bottom) of the joint PDF on service affinities fU1,U2(u1, u2) in
Prop. A.4 for ρ = −1/2 (left) and ρ = 1/2 (right).
and so limρ→1 FU1,U2(u1, u2) = min{u1, u2}. Finally, as ρ → −1 observe as F−1Z (u2) +
F−1Z (v1) ≷ 0 the function inside FZ(·) in Eq. (23) goes to ±∞, respectively. Observe
F−1Z (u2) + F
−1
Z (v1) ≷ 0 ⇔ F−1Z (u2) ≷ F−1Z (1− v1) ⇔ v1 + u2 ≷ 1. (25)
Thus:
u1 + u2 ≤ 1 ⇒ lim
ρ→−1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ u1
0
FZ(−∞)dv1 = 0 (26)
u1 + u2 ≥ 1 ⇒ lim
ρ→−1
FU1,U2(u1, u2) =
∫ 1−u2
0
FZ(−∞)dv1 +
∫ u1
1−u2
FZ(∞)dv1 = u1 + u2 − 1
and so limρ→1 FU1,U2(u1, u2) = max{u1 + u2 − 1, 0}.
The following two functions are central to the subsequent proposition.
ψu,ρ(v) ≡ FZ
(
F−1Z (u − v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
(27)
φu,ρ(v) ≡ fZ
(
F−1Z (u− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
1
fZ(F
−1
Z (u− v))
(28)
for i) u ∈ (0, 2], ii) v ∈ [0, u] when u ∈ (0, 1] and v ∈ [u − 1, 1] when u ∈ (1, 2], and iii)
ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
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Proposition A.6. The aggregate affinity under bundling U = U1 + U2 has CDF
FU (u) =


∫ u
0
ψu,ρ(v)dv, u ∈ (0, 1]∫ 1
u−1
ψu,ρ(v)dv + u− 1, u ∈ [1, 2]
(29)
and PDF
fU (u) =


1√
1−ρ2
∫ u
0
φu,ρ(v)dv, u ∈ (0, 1]
1√
1−ρ2
∫ 1
u−1
φu,ρ(v)dv, u ∈ [1, 2]
(30)
for ψu,ρ(v) in Eq. (27) and φu,ρ(v) in Eq. (28). Further, FU (1) = 1/2 for all ρ.
Proof of Prop. A.6. From Eq. (16), the CDF of U = U1 + U2 in terms of the iid
standard normal random variables (Z1, Z2) and the correlation parameter ρ is
FU (u) = P
(
FZ(Z1) + FZ
(
ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2
)
≤ u
)
. (31)
For u ∈ (0, 1] condition on z1 ∈ R, split the integral at z1 = F−1Z (u), and note the event of
interest cannot occur for z1 > F
−1
Z (u):
FU (u) =
∫ F−1Z (u)
−∞
P(FZ(Z1) + FZ(ρZ1 +
√
1− ρ2Z2) ≤ u|Z1 = z1)fZ(z1)dz1 (32)
Simplification gives the top equation in Eq. (34). For u ∈ (1, 2] condition on z1 ∈ R, split the
integral at z1 = F
−1
Z (u− 1) and notice the event of interest is assured for z1 ≤ F−1Z (u− 1):
FU (u) = FZ(F
−1
Z (u−1))+
∫ ∞
F
−1
Z (u−1)
P(FZ(z1)+FZ(ρz1+
√
1− ρ2Z2) ≤ u)fZ(z1)dz1 (33)
Simplification gives the bottom equation in Eq. (34).
FU (u) =


∫ F−1Z (u)
−∞
FZ
(
F−1Z (u− FZ(z1))− ρz1√
1− ρ2
)
fZ(z1)dz1, u ∈ (0, 1]
u− 1 +
∫ ∞
F
−1
Z (u−1)
FZ
(
F−1Z (u− FZ(z1))− ρz1√
1− ρ2
)
fZ(z1)dz1, u ∈ [1, 2]
(34)
Change variables from z1 to v = FZ(z1) to obtain Eq. (29).
Apply the Leibniz integral rule to differentiate FU (u) and apply the inverse function
theorem. For u ∈ [0, 1]:
fU (u) = FZ
(
F−1Z (u − u)− ρF−1Z (u)√
1− ρ2
)
+
∫ u
0
d
du
FZ
(
F−1Z (u − v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv
=
1√
1− ρ2
∫ u
0
fZ
(
F−1Z (u− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
1
fZ(F
−1
Z (u− v))
dv (35)
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Change variables from z1 to v = FZ(z1) to obtain the top equation in Eq. (30). Likewise,
for u ∈ (1, 2]:
fU (u) = 1− FZ
(
F−1Z (u− (u − 1))− ρF−1Z (u− 1)√
1− ρ2
)
+
∫ 1
u−1
d
du
FZ
(
F−1Z (u− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv
=
1√
1− ρ2
∫ 1
u−1
fZ
(
F−1Z (u− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
1
fZ(F
−1
Z (u− v))
dv (36)
Change variables from z1 to v = FZ(z1) to obtain the bottom equation in Eq. (30).
Finally, we show FU (1) = 1/2 for all ρ. Observe F
−1
Z (1− v) = −F−1Z (v) and thus
FU (1) =
∫ 1
0
FZ
(
F−1Z (1− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv =
∫ 1
0
FZ
(
−F−1Z (v)
√
1 + ρ
1− ρ
)
dv. (37)
Set a = −
√
(1 + ρ)/(1− ρ) and write the last expression above as
g1(a) =
∫ 1
0
FZ(aF
−1
Z (v))dv =
∫ ∞
−∞
FZ(az)fZ(z)dz, (38)
using the change of variable z = F−1Z (v). The derivative w.r.t. a is
g′1(a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
zfZ(az)fZ(z)dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(z, a)dz, (39)
for g2(z, a) ≡ zfZ(az)fZ(z). Now observe g2(z, a) = −g2(−z, a), i.e., g2(z, a) is an odd
function in z for all a, and thus g′1(a) = 0, and g1(a) is a constant for all a. Using the
change of variable u = FZ(z) at a = 1 gives
g1(1) =
∫ 1
0
udu =
1
2
. (40)
Thus FU (1) = 1/2 for all ρ.
Representative plots of the CDF and PDF for U in Prop. A.6 are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. The CDF (left) and PDF (right) for the aggregate affinity U = U1 + U2 from Prop. A.6 for
ρ ∈ {−0.9,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 0.9}.
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Remark A.7. The standard tool to construct a joint distributions with specified
marginals is the copula [Nelsen 2009]. In our context, a copula would specify a joint dis-
tribution on [0, 1]2 with uniform marginals on [0, 1]. Although there are many copulas that
handle this quite easily, our requirements are a bit specific in that we desire i) to directly
parameterize the correlation of the joint distribution, and ii) to have a “simple” distribu-
tion for the sum U = U1 + U2. Although the construction we have employed falls short
of this second objective in that FU is expressible only in terms of an integral, nonetheless
our preliminary investigation into copulas has not identified a candidate family of copulas
meeting both objectives.
Remark A.8. Correlation is not in general a sufficient parameter to completely capture
the dependence of the adoption level on the joint distribution. In fact we expect that the
adoption levels of two joint distributions on [0, 1]2 with uniform marginals and common
correlation may have distinct adoption levels, precisely because the solution of h(x) =
x depends upon the distribution of the aggregate affinity, FU . Nonetheless, we view the
correlation parameter as an insightful knob to vary in order to highlight the fact that the
adoption level is quite sensitive to the joint distribution of the affinities.
A.2. Separate adoption equilibria under uniformly distributed user affinities
Proposition 4.1 characterized the possible equilibria for separate service offerings when the
user service affinities are uniform random variables. The results are illustrated in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Illustration of Prop. 4.1. Equilibria adoption levels for continuous affinities with separate service
offerings. Equilibria x∗i ∈ [0, 1] solve hi(xi) = xi, where hi(xi) has thresholds li, ri. The left figure shows the
four orderings (a) li < 0 < ri < 1, (b) li < 0 < 1 < ri, (c) 0 < li < ri < 1, and (d) 0 < li and 1 < ri, with
black (open) dots indicating stable (unstable) equilibria. The possible equilibria are 0, 1, (1 − ci)/(1 − ei).
The first three subfigures of the right figure show the (ci, ei) plane and the regions for which each of the
three equilibria are found. The final subfigure on the bottom right shows a partition of the (ci, ei) plane in
terms of the lowest possible stable equilibria.
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Fig. 7. The four equilibria regions Rl,±,Rr,± of the (c, e) plane in Eq. (11) for continuous and independent
affinities (U1, U2).
A.3. Bundle adoption equilibria under continuous users affinity distributions
Proposition A.9. The probability of bundle adoption h(x) in Eq. (4) at adoption level
x for aggregate continuous affinity U from Prop. A.6 is
h(x) =


0, x ≤ l
2− (c− ex)−
∫ 1
c−ex−1
FZ
(
F−1Z (c− ex− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv, l < x ≤ m
1−
∫ c−ex
0
FZ
(
F−1Z (c− ex− v)− ρF−1Z (v)√
1− ρ2
)
dv, m < x ≤ r
1, r < x
,
(41)
for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2
e
, m ≡ c−1
e
, and r ≡ c
e
. The function h(x) has the following
properties:
(1 ) h′(x) = efU (c− ex) ≥ 0
(2 ) h
′′
(x) = −e2f ′U (c− ex)
(3 ) h(m) = 12
Stable equilibria include x∗ ∈ {0, 1}, where x∗ = 0 is an equilibrium provided h(0) = 0 ⇔
c > 2, and x∗ = 1 is an equilibrium provided h(1) = 1⇔ c < e.
Proof. Eq. (41) is immediate from the definition h(x) = P(U > c − ex) in Eq. (4)
and Prop. A.6. The first two properties are immediate from the definition of h(x) and the
fact that the CDF of U is differentiable, by assumption. The property h(m) = 1/2 follows
immediately from FU (1) = 1/2 in Prop. A.6.
As stated in Corollary 4.4, bundle adoption equilibria satisfy h(x) = x with solutions
given by Eq. (10).
The regions in Eq. (11) are illustrated in Fig. 7, which illustrates their shape. Observe i)
e = 2(c − 1) is the solution of ξ∗l,± = m and ξ∗r,± = m, ii) e = 1/(2(2 − c)) is the solution
of 2(c − 2)e + 1 = 0 where 2(c − 2)e + 1 is the discriminant of ξ∗l,± in Eq. (10), and iii)
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e = 12 (c+
√
c2 − 2) is the solution of 2(e− c)e+1 = 0 where 2(e− c)e+1 is the discriminant
of ξ∗r,± in Eq. (10).
A.4. Separate adoption equilibria under discrete user affinities
Fig. 8 illustrates possible adoption equilibria under discrete user affinities, and the regions
of the (ci, ei) plane they correspond to.
Fig. 8. Illustration of Prop. 5.1. Left: the eight possible orderings of {li, ri} with {0, 1/2, 1} each determine
the subset of {0, 1/2, 1} that are equilibria. All equilibria are stable. Right: the (ci, ei) plane and the
equilibria in each region. Bottom right: partition of the (ci, ei) plane according to lowest stable equilibria.
A.5. Bundle adoption equilibria under discrete user affinities
Fig. 9 parallels Fig. 8, and illustrates Prop. 5.2. Of interest is comparing the bottom-right
plots of Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, to identify the regions where bundling yields a higher adoption
equilibrium10. Different regions, and therefore outcomes arise as ρ varies.
10Note though that the bottom-left plot of Fig. 9 is for the specific value of ρ = 0.
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Fig. 9. Illustration of Prop. 5.2. Top: the probability of adoption h(x) in Eq. (12) in terms of p (left) and
ρ (right). Bottom: the regions of the (c, e) plane for each of the four equilibria {0, (1 + ρ)/4, (3− ρ)/4, 1}.
Also shown are the superimposed boundaries of the four equilibria regions, as well as the partition of the
(c, e) plane according to the lowest stable equilibria. The figures are shown for ρ = 0.
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